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Abstract 
Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was one of the main exponents of evolutionary thinking 
in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century. He gave that kind of thinking an 
unprecedented metaphysical turn. In consequence of his versatility he also 
encountered the notion of truth-making, which he connected with his ever-present 
concerns about time and duration. Eager to stress the dimension of radical change and 
of novelty in the nature of things, he rejected (in one form) what he called “the 
retrograde movement of the true” while championing it – with undeniable delight in 
the air of paradox – in a derivative form. In the paper I explain what “the retrograde 
movement of the true” consists in – in its two forms. 
 
Introduction 
We may have different levels of expectation relative to an account of truth-making. 
Many things may vary: the questions to be addressed, the distinctions to be made, the 
logical aspects to be taken care of, and the kind of dialectic to be engaged in. A 
minimal notion of what an account of truth-making should consist of may include the 
following elements: 
-the explicit identification of truth-bearers; 
-the correlative identification of “that in virtue of which” a given true truth-bearer is 
true; i.e., of the relevant truth-makers; 
-the idea of a specific, asymmetric, non causal relation, between a truth-maker and the 
correlative true truth-bearer: with the phrase “that in virtue of which”, this idea is 
already implicit in the preceding clause. 
Furthermore, an account of truth-making may either have the aim of articulating a 
formal theory of truth – the theory being an end it itself –; or it may do some work in 
addressing other issues. A comparison can be made with ethics, where we find, as 
distinctive areas of inquiry, ethical theory on the one hand, and applied ethics on the 
other. 
In an author like Henri Bergson, we discover an account of truth-making to the extent 
that our requirements remain minimal, technically speaking; and that we accept that 
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the account stays embedded in the treatment of questions which go beyond the formal 
theory of truth. 
This is not to say that we should forget about an account such as Bergson’s; and this 
for two main reasons: (i) On the side of the theory of truth-making, we may benefit 
from extending its thematic spectrum to such an author, even quite radical, because of 
the wealth of interesting investigations which his writings contain. Bergson’s case 
study in truth-making will provide an original material, able to enrich other, more 
focused accounts. (ii) If we take the side of the understanding of Bergson, it is 
obvious that we have to articulate certain of his preoccupations in terms of an account 
of truth-making. They cry out for such a treatment. As we shall see, Bergson does not 
belong properly, given his views on truth-making, to the context of pragmatism, to 
which no doubt he was close in some respects1. What he has to say about truth 
requires the rejection of the anti-realism otherwise characteristic of pragmatism. 
One last introductory consideration: Bergson, given his philosophical predilections, 
addresses most issues from a concern for the role of time and duration. This is true 
also with the present topic. At an earlier stage, accounts of truth-making did little to 
interfere with views on the metaphysics of time; but this has changed significantly. 
Following Armstrong’s chapter on time in his 2004 (ch. 11), we have seen a growing 
interference between accounts of truth-making and the metaphysics of time. So the 
obstacles to the idea of addressing the views of Bergson concerning truth-making can 
be overcome2. 
 
A minimal account 
What Bergson has to say, as far as his account of truthmaking is concerned, belongs 
principally to the first and third chapters of his collection of articles of 19343, 
respectively: “The Retrograde Movement of the True” (“Le mouvement rétrograde du 
vrai”) and “The Possible and the Actual” (“Le possible et le réel"). The title “The 
Retrograde Movement of the True” is slightly odd, because this retrograde movement 
is something which Bergson precisely rejects in its primitive form (though he accepts 
it in a derivative form). We may say that according to him there is a problem of the 
                                                
1 See ch. 7, “On William James’ Pragmatism: Truth and Reality” in his 1959a. 
2 My interest in the topic of this paper originated with a mention of Bergson’s view on “retrogradation 
of truth” by Vuillemin 1996, pp. 148-149. 
3 Ironically enough, the main treatment of these questions was elaborated by Bergson for his English 
lectures at Columbia University (New York) in 1913. See Bergson 1959a, p. 1264, fn. 1. The lectures 
have not been recovered to this day. 
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retrograde movement of the true, and that his analysis of this problem leads him to the 
conclusion that in primitive form there is no such thing as the retrograde movement of 
the true. 
Now the problem is couched in terms that depend on an account of truthmaking – 
minimal as it may well be. So let me first say a few words about the three basic issues 
listed at the beginning of this paper. 
 
-Truth-bearers 
Bergson’s truth-bearers are basically judgements, dated acts of judgement; they have 
an inner structure, given that they contain terms. Otherwise, Bergson gives no specific 
account of judgement-content. He moves without much ado from the act of judging as 
a token, to the judgement as a type; and from there to the judgement as an ideal 
content (1959a, p. 1263). 
 
-Truth-makers 
Bergson’s account here is not fine-grained either: the truth-maker is “the occurrence 
(apparition) of a thing or of an event”, which the judgement “records” (1959a, 
p. 1263). 
 
-The relation 
Bergson writes very little about this relation: “the judgement, which records the 
occurrence of a thing or of an event, can come only after them” (1959a, p. 1263). The 
phrase “can only come after them” jointly conveys the temporal aspect of succession 
and the ontological aspect of asymmetric dependence. 
 
The canonical view of judgement 
Bergson basically addresses only one type of judgment: singular, historical, 
contingent judgement. And, we may add, affirmative judgement. Once an event has 
taken place, its occurrence can then be stated, it can be recorded by the judgment. 
Thus the formation of a given truth-bearer is posterior to the relevant truth-maker. For 
Bergson, the lesson is this: there is basically an insertion in time for any historical 
judgement: “[the judgment] thus has its date” (1959a, p. 1263). When he writes this, 
he speaks of the date of the judgment – as an act. This date indicates the time of the 
very existence of the true judgement. It does not overlap with the date of the event 
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(which features in the judgement-content, locating the event in time). Indeed, what is 
at stake is not the time of the truth of a truth-bearer either (in the sense in which a 
tensed judgement may first be false and then become true at a time). Here the truth-
bearer is not exposed to truth-value changes, because the content includes a date. So 
overall in a correct account of truth-bearers we must take heed of two dates: the usual 
date which indicates the temporal location of the event, and another date which 
determines the time at which the judgement is formed. This time is dependent on the 
date of the relevant event, and is slightly posterior to it. This has the following 
structure (Diagram 1): 
 
 
 
We may conclude that according to Bergson, a judgement in canonical form (CF) has 
to be given in the following way: 
 
(CF) At t0+Δt there is the true judgement J that the event E takes place at t0 
 
This is the legitimate structure concerning judgement; it applies as such to historical 
judgements. Now we wish to express the dependence of such a formula (CF) on the 
realization of the event (DE for “dependence”): 
 
Time of the 
judgement J 
that event E 
takes place 
Time of the 
event E 
       t0 
t0+Δt 
Diagram 1 
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(DE) If at t0+Δt there is the true judgement J that the event E takes place at t0, then E 
takes place at t0 
 
An additional condition must be provisionally taken into account; namely, that the 
event has been observed (DEO for “dependence” and “observation”). (We come back 
to this later.) 
 
(DEO) if at t0+Δt there is the true judgement J that the event E takes place at t0, then 
(E takes place at t0, and E gets observed at t0) 
 
All of this is unproblematic, to Bergson, or to anybody else. 
 
The retrograde movement of the true: how it works 
Now I come closer to the properly Bergsonian topic of the retrograde movement of 
the true. In order for the retrogradation to take place, a first step is needed. The 
“observation clause” – the requirement for an actual observation to have taken place – 
has to be lifted from (DEO), and replaced with a “de jure conditional” (DJ, for de 
jure, en droit). Bergson describes this in the following way: “The true judgement may 
well have been left unformulated: it did set itself de jure, before it was factually set 
out.” (1959a, p. 1263) Presumably the idea is that in itself the actual observation 
makes no real difference to the proceedings. The suppression of the clause concerning 
actual observation also allows us to treat the occurrence of the event as sufficient for 
the correlative “virtual” judgement. 
 
(DJ) If the event E takes place at t0, then at t0+Δt there is de jure the true judgement J 
that E takes place at t0 
 
As far as I can see, Bergson does not object to this specific step, which leaves the time 
constraints intact. Given that he does not insist on actual observations, obviously he is 
no verificationist. The kind of ontology of judgement and terms he stands for, remains 
in need of a thorough investigation. 
 
Now comes the decisive step. The view prevails in common thinking that the first 
date featuring in the canonical form (CF) can be suppressed. Bergson writes: “To 
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every true [judgement] […] we impress a retrograde movement.” (1959a, p. 1263) 
Elsewhere he comments: “[Modern philosophers] make of truth something which is 
anterior to the well-determined act of formulating it for the first time.” (1959a, p. 
1446; see also p. 1445) 
 
On account of this step, we switch, from a dated view given by (CF) above, to an 
omnitemporal view of judgement (OV for “omnitemporal view). 
 
(OV) If at time t there is the true judgement J, then at all times there is the true 
judgement J 
 
This principle (OV) comes into application from the use of our understanding 
(intelligence.) Bergson writes: “This date [which attaches the existence of the truth-
bearer to a particular time] gets immediately erased, in virtue of the principle, which 
is rooted in our understanding, that every truth is eternal.” (1959a, p. 1263) In 
Bergson, human understanding has to do with action: “understanding is well fitted to 
deal with material things” (1959a, p. 1279). He never tires of insisting on the 
adaptation of understanding to practical concerns. 
 
Taking advantage of the principle (OV), we can make the following substitution in the 
principle (DJ) above, and reach the principle (AT) (AT for “any time”): 
 
(AT) If the event E takes place at t0, then at any time there is de jure the true 
judgement J that E takes place at t0 
 
Of course there is no problem if the judgement J is moved to the right, down the 
arrow of time. But if we move the judgement J to the left, up the arrow of time, 
problems are in view. Here we reach the “retrograde movement of the true” (RMT), 
represented in Diagram 2. 
 
 7 
 
 
In order for the problem to arise in its primitive Bergsonian form, we have yet to 
introduce a tensed view of time and then to pull t0 into the future. This means that we 
have to insert, in Diagram 2, an index N (N for “now”) between t0-Δt and t0; which 
brings us to the following formulation (RMTFT)(FT for “future time”): 
 
(RMTFT) If E takes place at a future time t0, then at any time (including at future times 
<t0, at present and in the past) there is de jure the true judgement J that E takes place 
at that future time t0 
 
Strikingly, as we shall see, (RMT) will also come in an innocuous form, (RMTPT) (PT 
for “past time”). This means that we have to insert, in Diagram 2, an index N (N for 
“now”) to the right of t0. 
 
(RMTPT) If the event E takes place at a past time t0, then at any time (including at 
times past <t0) there is de jure the true judgement J that E takes place at that past time 
t0. 
 
Time of the 
judgement J 
that E takes 
place 
Time of 
event E 
       t0 
t0-Δt 
RMT 
Diagram 2 
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On the convertibility of prior truth and anterior possibility 
Before going into more detail, we must notice that the retrograde movement of the 
true closely connects with the notion of the possible such as it is treated by Bergson 
(see 1959a, ch. 3). We may say that the retrograde movement of the true and a 
corresponding “retrograde movement of the possible” fully overlap. To say: there is 
an antecedently true judgement about an event E, on Bergson’s account, amounts to 
saying: it is antecedently possible that E; and vice-versa. This is surprising, because 
on the usual view there are unrealized possibilities. In such cases we would like to say 
that it is antecedently possible that an event E will happen; but not, at the same time 
that there is the antecedently true judgement that E will happen (because E will not 
happen). Bergson rejects this. Generally speaking, Bergson is strongly opinionated on 
the issue of possibility4, and his position can be expressed by means of what is usually 
called the “principle of plenitude” (PP). The principle (PP) says that what is possible 
also gets realized at some time. 
 
(PP) If the event E is possible (untensed), then at some time E is actual (untensed) 
 
In Bergson’s view a principle of plenitude applies in a degenerate way, which 
specifies an even tighter link between possibility and actuality: 
 
(PPB) If the event E is possible E (tensed), then E is actual (tensed) 
 
Here is how Bergson expresses himself: “There is more, and not less, in the 
possibility of each of the successive states, than in their actuality. Indeed, the possible 
is nothing but the actual, with a mental act added to it; a mental act which projects the 
image of the actual in the past once the actual has taken place.” (1959a, p. 1339) Or 
alternatively: “the creation of possibilities coincides with the creation of the 
corresponding actualities; they are not created ahead of their actualities.” (1959a, 
p. 1262) Given these elements, the basic insight comes as the contraposition of (PPB): 
 
(ContrapPPB) if the event E is not actual (tensed), then E is not possible (tensed) 
                                                
4 Quite in tune with other philosophers of the early twentieth century – one thinks of R. Carnap’s 
Scheinprobleme (1928) –, Bergson holds that many questions taken to be important in philosophy are 
merely consequences of defective assumptions. The usual view of possibility involves such 
assumptions. 
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This formula captures the restrictive view of possibility characteristic of Bergson (see 
1959a, p. 1267). In what follows, then, “antecedently true” and “antecedently 
possible” will be treated as convertible. Bergson expresses much of what he wants to 
say in relation to the possibility of an event E, rather than in relation with the true 
judgement that an event E is to take place. 
 
The retrograde movement of the true: what is not wrong with it 
Bergson considers the retrograde movement of the true (RMTFT) as illegitimate. 
What is at stake for him, we may say, is the existence of certain temporal limits of 
truth-making, limits that (RMTFT) fails to respect (though (RMTPT) does not!). But 
why should we admit such limits? What’s wrong with (RMTFT)? Is this structure not 
basic for all our deliberation, for all our previsions, and therefore for our capacity to 
be active on the basis of anticipation? In anticipation, we judge now that such and 
such an event will happen, and often we are right. After deliberation, we end up doing 
– quite often – one of the things we have been deliberating about. The conjunction of 
our anticipation of an event E and of the future realization of E then satisfies the 
formula (RMTFT) without problem – or so it seems, when we look at this 
retrospectively. 
 
I begin this section by considering two points that do not count for the explanation of 
the illegitimacy of (RMTFT). 
-Bergson’s criticism does not relate to the epistemic difficulties of prevision. His 
problem is not one which would have the following expression: judgements as such 
aptly characterize what will happen, but given that we cannot know about these future 
events, we better avoid making any judgements about them. This is not what Bergson 
argues about5. His quarrel with (RMTFT) is really linked to the question of truth. 
-Bergson’s criticism does not overlap with the long-established problems of “future 
contingents” and of “logical determinism”. In spite of his familiarity with Aristotelian 
topics, his concern is not specifically with what happens with future events normally 
given as contingent. And however close he may be to the great Aristotelian tradition 
according to which truth about the future is a threat for matters that are taken as 
                                                
5 Of course epistemic restrictions to foreknowledge can be philosophically sophisticated as Karl 
Popper’s example shows (1960). 
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important, he has a view of this threat that is different from the one which constitutes 
the usual problem of future contingents. He never identifies as a problem that – 
perhaps – true judgements about the future will make the future necessary, suppress 
contingency, etc. Bergson’s criticism of (RMTFT) is focused on a much more specific 
view he holds about the relation between the truth-bearer and the truth-maker. And 
given his stance on this, the problem of future contingents vanishes. To bring the 
point to a pitch: given that (RMTFT) is false (in this case there is no retrograde 
movement of the true), the traditional problem of future contingents does not arise at 
all! 
 
The temporal condition on the representative capacities of the judgement 
Let us come back to our question: Bergson considers the retrograde movement of the 
true (RMTFT) as illegitimate. What is at stake for him, we may say, is the existence of 
certain temporal limits of truth-making, limits that (RMTFT) fails to respect. But why 
should we admit such limits? What’s wrong with (RMTFT)? 
The point is that we have to take heed, we may say, of a “time of the representative 
capacities of a judgement”. This has to do with the content of the judgement, and 
therefore with its semantics. The semantic condition, requiring a temporal relation 
between what represents and what is represented, is conveyed by means of the terms 
that are constitutive of the judgement. Bergson puts his point in the following 
rhetorical interjections: “As if a judgement could have pre-existed to the terms which 
enter into its composition! As if these terms would not themselves date from the time 
when the objects which they represent did appear!” (1959a, p. 1263) Basically the 
representative capacity of a judgement concerning an event E cannot be formed ahead 
of E. Alternatively, an event of the same type must be available to account for the 
representative capacities of the judgement. With this possibility in view, I represent, 
in Diagram 3, the circumstances in which (RMT) – given the semantic condition – 
can be legitimate. 
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Diagram 3 applies insofar as the non living domain is concerned (here there is a 
simple unfolding of events, déroulement). Here successive events of the same type or 
events resulting from a mere rearrangement of data are available. But Diagram 3 does 
not apply where life or art are concerned. Even though, Bergson avers, 
“[philosophers] prove unable, whatever they do, to figure out to themselves what 
radical novelty (nouveauté) and imprevisibility are.” (1959a, p. 1260) With radical 
novelty, the semantic condition of the capacities of the judgment to represent what it 
has to represent is not satisfied. Then, providing representative capacities for a 
judgement requires simultaneity in time with the truth of the judgement. In the 
absence of representative capacities, there is no proper judgement, no truth-bearer. So 
in such circumstances (RMT) is false. 
 
The retrograde movement of the true: the last twist  
Now that we have reached this point, it is necessary to take account of one more 
original feature of Bergson’s position. The rejection of (RMT) is strictly tied to a 
tensed view, with consideration of the present/future break. Once we swing over to 
the past, (RMT) is not restricted any more (see Diagram 4): “Its possibility [i.e. the 
Time of the 
judgement J 
that E takes 
place 
Time of 
event E 
       t0 
t0-Δt 
RMT 
Time of the 
representative 
capacities of 
judgement J 
    t0-Δt 
 
N=now 
 N=now 
Diagram 3 
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possibility of a given event], which does not precede its actuality, will have preceded 
it once the actuality has appeared” (1959a, p. 1340). 
 
 
 
This gives a feeling of a “growing-time” view of time: all the time past is basically 
available to ensure that for a given judgement, the semantic requirement is met. It is 
worth remarking also, that in a very specific sense, we have here a breach of the 
principle of the irrevocability of the past. A given scheme of things, where (RMT) 
does not apply, passes, with the passage of time, into to a scheme of things where 
(RMT) does apply. Bergson especially underlines this change in respect to possibility 
(see 1959a, p. 1340). The retrograde movement of possibility, which does not take 
place in respect to future events, takes place once those very events are present or 
past. So the past is changed in respect to the possibilities it contains: past possibilities 
progressively crop up in virtue of the actualities which in the course of time the 
novelty of things brings forward.* 
 
*I am very grateful to Colin Geddes (Edinburgh) for his help with the preparation of 
the English version of this paper. 
Time of the 
judgement J 
that E takes 
place 
Time of 
event E 
       t0 
    t0-Δt 
RMT 
N=now 
 N=now 
Diagram 4 
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